

# Ontological nature of events

**Luiz Arthur Pagani (UFPR)**

`arthur@ufpr.br`

`people.ufpr.br/~arthur`

# 1 Sources

- Davidson: “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”
- Parsons: *Events in the Semantics of English*

# 2 Example

*Brutus stabbed Caesar*

↓

$\exists e[\textit{stabbing}(e) \wedge \textit{agent}(e, b) \wedge \textit{theme}(e, c) \wedge \textit{culminated}(e)]$

‘There is an event such that it is a stabbing, its agent is Brutus, its theme is Caesar, and the event already culminated’.

### 3 Problem

- Empirically convincing, mainly from the linguistic perspective,
- but it hides a technical question:
- events are treated as first order entities.

### 4 Traditional representation

*Brutus stabbed Caesar*

↓

$P[stab(b, c)]$

‘There was a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus’

## 5 Second order

Quantification of an event:

$$\exists X[\textit{stabbing}(X) \wedge X(b, c) \wedge \textit{culminated}(X)]$$

‘there is a stabbing relation going from Brutus to Caesar  
and it already culminated’

## 6 Question

- Why the first logical form, and not the latter?
- Methodological answer: for Davidson everything should be first order

## 7 Controversy

- Logical form of *everything runs*?
  - $\forall x[\exists e[\text{running}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e, x)]]$
  - $\forall e[\text{running}(e) \wedge \exists x[\text{agent}(e, x)]]?$
- First formula
  - there are things that could not run (at least the runnings don't)
- Second formula
  - there are things that could not be a running (at least the runners don't)
  - universal quantification of the events, not of individuals?!
- Anyway, both are false

## 8 First order approximation

$$\exists e[\textit{stabbing}(e) \wedge \textit{agent}(e, b) \wedge \textit{theme}(e, c) \wedge \textit{culminated}(e)]$$

as first order approximation of

$$\exists X[\textit{stabbing}(X) \wedge X(b, c) \wedge \textit{culminated}(X)]$$

### 8.1 Abbreviation

$$\exists e[\textit{event}(e) \wedge \textit{stabbing}(e) \wedge \textit{agent}(e, b) \wedge \textit{theme}(e, c) \wedge \textit{culminated}(e)]$$

## 9 Back to the controversy

- *Everything runs:*
  - $\forall x[individual(x) \rightarrow \exists e[running(e) \wedge agent(e, x)]]$
  - $\forall e[event(e) \rightarrow [running(e) \wedge \exists x[agent(e, x)]]]$
- Compatible representation
- but we have no explanation for universal quantification of events yet

## 10 Conclusion

- Event: first or second order entity?
- How to decide: which are the formal and empirical criteria?
- As first order approximation is there any lost comparing to the linguistic expression?